Anticipatory action for monsoon flooding in Bangladesh

by Emilie Gettliffe

Char Bara Dhul, Belkuchi Upazila, Sirajganj, Bangladesh. Floods submerged many houses on the Char Bara Dhul, a riverside village, leaving many residents marooned. WFP/Sayed Asif Mahmud

Over the last year the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been designing and delivering anticipatory action pilot projects in Somalia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Malawi to demonstrate and build understanding of collective anticipatory humanitarian action at scale as an important complement to traditional funding and response mechanisms. These pilots emerged from the strategic direction set in 2018 by Mark Lowcock, Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), to take a more anticipatory approach to humanitarian response (Casement Lecture, March 2018).

This blog summarises the results of the Bangladesh pilot in 2020. The Centre for Disaster Protection supported process learning from the pilot. This included collecting qualitative data through stakeholder interviews, meeting observation, and action-learning discussions. We outline the story of the pilot’s unfolding, offer three factors that facilitated its success, and three key lessons to take forward.  

The story of the 2020 anticipatory action pilot in Bangladesh

Despite the world being thrown into uncertainty due to covid-19, OCHA decided to continue with the pilot. The plan was to scale forecast-based action previously developed and implemented in Bangladesh by the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Bangladesh Red Crescent (BDRCS), and the German Red Cross (GRC). With little over two months to secure endorsement of a collective plan, this was a monumental goal. And yet, on 25 June the Resident Coordinator of Bangladesh and heads of UN agencies endorsed the Anticipatory Action Pilot Document. The ERC subsequently pre-approved the plan on 26 June, readying it for activation in the event the trigger was reached.

Eight days later, on 4 July, the 10-day readiness trigger was reached, automatically releasing financing to partner agencies. On 11 July the full activation trigger was reached, leading to immediate implementation of the plan. Within five days, WFP distributed cash transfers to almost 23,000 vulnerable households, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) distributed dignity and hygiene kits to over 15,000 women and girls, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) distributed livelihood support (animal feed or waterproof drums) to more than 18,500 households. Those involved in the pilot described it as a great achievement, demonstrating that collective anticipatory action at scale is possible.

…. So, what made this possible in the midst of such particularly challenging circumstances, and what did we learn?

Three key facilitating factors:

ONE. The pilot was built on strong in-country leadership, experience, and expertise, and played to OCHA’s coordinating and convening strengths.

Bangladesh was chosen as a pilot country due to prior experience with forecast-based action and a pre-established trigger. This meant there was considerable in-country experience to build on. Leadership was also present with support and strategic direction from the Resident Coordinator, key partners who maintained commitment to the pilot in the midst of the covid-19 crisis, and government counterparts well-experienced in disaster response. This allowed OCHA to play to its strengths in facilitation and coordination, and to use CERF funding to enable a major step in scaling anticipatory action.

TWO. Partners shared—and were consistently reminded of—a clear common purpose and sense of urgency to assist some of Bangladesh’s poorest and most vulnerable populations.

The clear direction offered by the ERC and Bangladesh’s Resident Coordinator helped to strategically focus the pilot on feasible and effective humanitarian interventions for monsoon flooding within a specific geographic area. Partner agencies came to the pilot with a common purpose; namely, to help scale an innovative pilot aiming to protect the dignity, lives, and livelihoods of people in poverty, and to learn from and build evidence on the approach.

THREE. Trust, transparency, and an explicit ‘pilot mindset’ supported pragmatism in designing and delivering a successful pilot.

From the early stages of the pilot, OCHA cultivated a collaborative and learning mindset among partners, which enabled the pilot to go ahead based on a mutual understanding that things wouldn’t necessarily be perfect. OCHA’s approach set a tone of transparency that encouraged partners to raise concerns and navigate hurdles while focusing on what was possible in the given timeframes. Additionally, OCHA made adjustments to its financing processes based on feedback from partners, demonstrating flexibility and real-time learning. OCHA and partner agencies welcomed the Centre’s involvement in process-learning, sharing challenges and lessons along the way.

Three major lessons on implementing successful anticipatory action:

ONE. Advance plans and protocols enable the rapid disbursement of CERF funds to vulnerable people at scale.

CERF funds were released within hours of the trigger being reached, and partners provided assistance to approximately 220,000 people within five days. A detailed step-by-step protocol for all administrative processes following the 10-day pre-activation facilitated this rapid disbursement of funds. All approvals had been completed ahead of time, enabling an almost automatic release of financing.

TWO. Targeting beneficiaries at scale requires time to allow for subcontracting and coordination, particularly for multifaceted interventions.

There is significant complexity in targeting the most vulnerable households in areas with millions living at or below global poverty levels. Partners demonstrated incredible effort and care in their targeting approach. For example, WFP verified the vulnerability of all beneficiaries by phone, and UNFPA specifically targeted the transgender community and adolescent girls. However, due to short timeframes for the verification of beneficiary lists, slow subcontracting arrangements, and restricted field access as a result of covid-19, fewer people received cash transfers than had been hoped. Partners also were unable to establish a coordinated targeting strategy in time, which limited the ability to deliver ‘cash +’ interventions (as the ‘cash’ and the ‘+’ were implemented by different partners).

THREE. Scaling and integrating anticipatory action into humanitarian response functions will require broader support for the approach.

Learning from the pilot highlights important considerations for scaling and sustainability. For example, how to cover readiness costs required months prior to a potential disaster. This is difficult to justify for any party, as there is no guarantee the trigger will be reached, or costs recovered. Ultimately, UN agencies and international NGOs may shift towards a ‘no regrets’ approach given the benefits of successful anticipatory action—preserving human lives, livelihoods, and dignity at a lower cost than is possible after a disaster has hit. However, such an approach can also run counter to the pressure to show that emergency relief funds have been wisely spent for people actually suffering from disasters. Additionally, while the pilot represented significant scaling of prior anticipatory action, it was small compared to the scale of needs across the region, which ultimately experienced some of the worst flooding in years. Getting to the scale needed requires integrating anticipatory approaches within social safety net systems, which in turn requires building government ownership of the approach.

Further details on the process learning from this pilot can be found here.